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strikers: "The only Black sit^downer in
the Flint strikes was Roscoe Van Zandt in
Plant 4. At first, the southern white work-
ers didn't know what to make of it. All
they could say to him was, 'What the hell
are you doing here? You haven't got any
job to protect.' ... When it came time for
the victory parade, the strikers voted for
Roscoe Van Zandt to carry the flag out of
the plant." (24)
But even readers long familiar with
such inspiring pictures of the Flint sit-
down may find themselves brought up
short by the story of Johnson's sub-
sequent suffering. Blacklisted in Flint,
she embarked on a speaking tour for the
CIO. It left her exhausted; she collapsed
from tuberculosis, losing a lung. Shortly
thereafter she lost her youngest boy,
Jarvis, in a car accident. Then her older
son, Dennis, died of multiple sclerosis.
She and Kermit separated.
Despite these agonizing tragedies,
Johnson was soon remarried to Sol
DolUnger, a socialist and trade unionist,
who would be her steadfast companion
for the next half-century. During World
War II, she became an industrial worker
and effective rank-and-file organizer of
women war workers in Detroit, only to
suffer a brutal beating at the hands of
mafia goons in 1945. In 1977, when in-
vited back by the UAW and GM for a 
40-year anniversary celebration of the sit-
downs, she declined but showed up to
issue a strongly worded denunciation of
"tuxedo unionism," that is, bureaucratic
cosiness with corporations, and conces-
sionary bargaining, which were destroy-
ing the UAW she built.
One can only hope that the militant
labour movement Genora Johnson
Dollinger hoped to see revive will be
aided by Susan Rosenthal's marvellous
oral history. Striking Flint provides a new
generation with the bracing story of
woman who to the end of her life re-
mained dedicated to "social ownership of
the means of production" as the only way
"to stop the ruling class from dominating
humanity, and for working people to
achieve their liberation." (41)
Christopher Phelps
Monthly Review Press
Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Danger-
ous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuiher and 
the Fate of American Labor (New York:
Basic Books 1995).
THE UNITED Automobile Workers Union
(UAW) has been a popular research topic
of historians, journalists, activists, and
other labour specialists, giving us a not 
only vast, but also highly contentious lit-
erature on the topic. No single person is
more central to these scholarly and con-
temporary debates than long time (1946-
1970) UAW president, Walter Reuther.
Discussions of Reuther's leadership often
revolve around the factional struggles
that the UAW encountered — and in
which Reuther played a pivotal role
—during the 1930s and 1940s. Any biog:
raphy of Reuther is necessarily, therefore,
cast into a web of highly polemical and
tendentious debates which seemingly re-
quire the author to declare allegiance to
one side or the other.
Nelson Lichtenstein's recent biogra-
phy of Walter Reuther is a welcome con-
tribution (o this literature. Much to his
credit, Lichtenstein skillfully avoids sim-
ply taking sides in the fifty-year debate.
Neither celebrating nor vilifying Reuther,
Lichtenstein attempts to understand the
ambitious politically and socially moti-
vated labour leader within the specific
context which he lived. Lichtenstein con-
vincingly argues that Reuther consis-
tently sought broader social and political
changes, but that Reuther failed when he
became "imprisoned within institutions,
alliances, and ideological constructs that
were largely of his own making." (300)
World War II is the crucial period in
Lichtenstein's analysis. During World
War II, Lichtenstein argues, Reuther
abandoned the shopfloor syndicalism that
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the auto workers utilized successfully in
the mid-1930s in favour of corporatist
solutions. This "Faustian Bargain" pro-
vided Reuther access into elite political
and business circles but also required
compromises which hindered his capacity
to transform larger society. While the
UAW made advances for its members, in-
creasing wages, benefits, working condi-
tions, and job stability, the range of pos-
sibilities for the UAW to create political
and social change narrowed. When politi-
cal and social radicalism emerged
strongly in the 1960s, Reuther's attach-
ment to limited collective bargaining
goals, his alliance with the Democratic
party, and his desire to maintain unques-
tioned leadership in the UAW all hindered
his ability to embrace others who shared
goals of broader social and political
change. He became trapped by the politi-
cal and social world he had created.
A central component of the bargain
that Reuther made with political and busi-
ness leaders included, according to Licht-
enstein, the control of a sometimes turbu-
lent and unpredictable rank-and-file.
Reuther's desire to achieve political
power and maintain dominance in the
UAW required that the UAW become a 
"responsible" union which submitted to a 
system of "industrial jurisprudence" to
solve shopfloor problems. This led to the
creation of highly complex, slow, and
often unresponsive grievance procedures,
which left committeemen with little shop-
floor power. Early attempts of the UAW
to play a larger role in the workplace
failed to displace traditional management
prerogatives. The UAW and Reuther be-
came attached to strict enforcement of 
contracts which both provided material
gains to its members, and sometimes con-
strained rank-and-file militancy.
In Lichtenstein's analysis, Reuther's
alliance with the Democratic party proved
most limiting to his larger goals. He sup-
ported Socialist party candidates like
Norman Thomas in the early 1930s, but
by World War H abandoned any hope of
third party politics. He focused his atten-
tion on realigning the Democratic party,
attempting to transform it into a truly lib-
eral-labour party. Reuther's alliance with
the Democratic party was seductive in its
potential; but real power within the party
proved quite illusive. The alliance led to
some of Reuther's more difficult and em-
barrassing political compromises. The
tactics used by Reuther in attempting to
undermine the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic party at the 1964 Convention,
for example, were unseemly and belied
his very public support of mainstream
civil rights organizations.
Lichtenstein argues that Reuther be-
came trapped not just by the institutions
which he helped create and the alliances
he forged, but also by an ideological nar-
rowing of political options in the postwar
period. At the same time, we might quib-
ble with Lichtenstein's emphasis of cau-
sality on the narrowing of the political
landscape. He argues that the general
rightward shift that followed the 1946
election combined with the growth of
anti-communism led to a "sharp turn
against Communists within virtually all
labor and liberal organizations." (257)
Lichtenstein acknowledges the rank and
often opportunistic nature of Reuther's
widely cast anti-communism, but he also
sees Reuther's attacks as a necessary re-
action to the more general anti-commu-
nism growing in politics and society.
Anti-communism, in this perspective,
was necessary for the very survival of the
UAW. But this is misleading. Reuther and
other important UAW staffers such as Joe
Rauh played early and critical roles in
legitimizing the pervasive anti-commu-
nism that defined postwar American lib-
eralism. In addition, Reuther's anti-com-
munism was much more than a reaction to
the 1946 election and the rightward turn
of American politics. Reuther used anti-
communism to bludgeon many of his ene-
mies well before 1946 and often in a hap-
hazard fashion which helped delegitimize
any politics to the left of his own.
Reuther's anti-communism thus had a se-
rious impact in narrowing the political
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possibilities in the Democratic party.
When Lichtenstein argues that Reuther
"positioned the UAW at the left margin of
conventional politics," (303) he suggests
that Reuther analyzed the politics of the
possible and sought the most radical po-
sition available. But this is again mislead-
ing. Reuther was positioned "at the left
margin" of mainstream politics primarily
because he had made — in liberal organi-
zations like ADA and in the UAW — poli-
tics any further left susceptible to anti-
communist attacks from many different
quarters.
It is unfortunate that Lichtenstein,
who pays close attention and attempts to
address important political and racial is-
sues in a nuanced manner, fails to address
gender issues. In the early portions of the
books, which deal with the formative
years of the UAW, Lichtenstein contents
with the organization of female workers
into the UAW. But after Lichtenstein fol-
lows Reuther's corporatist turn during
World War II, women disappear entirely
from the book. The UAW Women's De-
partment developed into an important or-
ganization both within the UAW and
within the larger trade union and feminist
movements. Yet it is entirely absent from
Lichtenstein's study. Moreover, it is
probably not a coincidence that when
Lichtenstein addresses women skillfully,
he relies almost exclusively on the secon-
dary work of other historians, as opposed
to making his own original contributions.
We must conclude that after World War
II either Reuther had no concern for
women's issues or the Women's Depart-
ment, or that Lichtenstein found them in-
sufficiently important to include. Neither
explanation is very satisfying.
Placing the above criticisms aside,
The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit is a 
consistently and convincingly argued
book. It is well informed by the secondary
literature and based on extensive primary
research. Lichtenstein attempts to see
Reuther as a complex and powerful politi-
cal and trade union leader who operated
within a specific political and social con-
text. He should be applauded for trying to
understand Reuther outside of rank po-
lemical terms, a perspective which will
certainly attract more academic critics
than allies. This is a major contribution to
the already rich UAW historiography
which is sure to continue old debates
while also beginning new ones.
Joseph M. Turrini
Wayne State University
Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday 
of American Liberalism 1945-1968 (Ith-
aca and London: Cornell University Press
1995).
BOYLE CHALLENGES the emerging ar-
gument that during the height of postwar
liberal ascendancy, a centralized and bu-
reaucratized labour movement sowed the
seeds of its own destruction by abandon-
ing hopes for a social democratic break-
through. He does this by focusing on one
of the largest and most politically active
unions in the country: the UAW. He con-
centrates his analysis on four national
policy areas (full employment, federal ur-
ban policy, African-American civil
rights, and the containment of Commu-
nism in Asia) and presidential election
campaigns between 1945 and 1968,
which together lay at the centre of both
the UAW's and the nation's agenda during
this period. He doesn't hesitate to admit
that his approach is unabashedly top-
down, institutional history.
Boyle locates the UAW, its top lead-
ers, and especially its president, Walter
Reuther, as the "inheritors of the social
democratic ideological and political for-
mations" that the union struggled to es-
tablish in earlier decades, and the forces
that kept the quest for progressive politics
alive. The post-war UAW leadership built
a cross-class, biracial reform coalition
based on unionists, middle-class liberals,
and African Americans. It appealed to
middle-class liberals by supporting eco-
nomic growth and anti-communism, and
